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Case 1:18-cv-05775-ERK-TAM Document 113-1 Filed 12/26/23 Page 1 of 62 PageID #: 1165

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Subject: Activity in Case 1:18-cv-05775-ERK-TAM Star Auto Sales of Bayside, Inc. et al v. Voynow, Bayard, Whyte and Company, LLP

et al Order on Motion for Discovery

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U.S. District Court

Eastern District of New York

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The following transaction was entered on 12/13/2023 at 6:49 PM EST and filed on 12/13/2023

Case Name: Star Auto Sales of Bayside, Inc. et al v. Voynow, Bayard, Whyte and Company, LLP et al

Case Number: 1:18-cv-05775-ERK-TAM https://ecf.nyed.uscourts.gov/ ...>

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Docket Text:

Minute Entry and Order: A telephonic status conference was held on 12/13/2023 before Magistrate Judge Taryn A. Merkl. Appearances by Jamie Scott Felsen, Joseph M. Labuda, and Jeremy Michael Koufakis for Plaintiffs, and Maureen Fitzgerald for Defendants. Discussion held regarding case status and open discovery issues from the 6/7/2023 Motion for Discovery (ECF No. [102]) and the 8/21/2023 Motion to Quash and Motion for Protective Order (ECF No. [108]), as reported by the parties in their 9/7/2023 joint status report (ECF No. [109]). As stated on the record, Plaintiffs' four requests and two motions are denied, in part.

Plaintiff's demand number nine (ECF No. 102, at 2-3) for additional samples of engagement letters for tax and review engagements is denied for the reasons stated on the record, including the finding that, in light of the discovery already produced by Defendants, further discovery on this issue is not proportional to the needs of the case. Denial of the motion is also warranted because the motion fails to include a certification that the parties conferredappropriately in an attempt to resolve this issue without judicial intervention. Indeed, Plaintiffs' counsel confirmed on the record that they had not previously discussed with defense counsel their request for the provision of records related to Defendants' engagements with the two specific entities discussed today (Kerdeck and Peruzzi Auto Groups). EDNY Local Rule 37.3(a) requires parties to "attempt to confer in good faith in person or by telephone in an effort to resolve the dispute, in conformity with Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1)." For these two reasons, Plaintiffs'

request for further discovery on this issue is denied.

Plaintiffs' demand number six (ECF No. 102, at 4-5) for a blank checklist for a review engagement is denied in part. Despite extensive discussion, the record is not completely clear whether Defendant Voynow uses a publicly available review engagement checklist or a custom review engagement checklist. The parties are directed to meet and confer to get a definitive answer to this question and resolve the dispute, either with a limited verified interrogatory, a declaration, or some other means, no later than 1/5/2024, the deadline for all discovery.

Plaintiffs' motion to quash subpoena (ECF No. 108, at 1-4) is denied. As discussed on the record, on August 2, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for an extension of all discovery, and unequivocally extended the fact discovery deadline specifically to August 31, 2023, in light of myriad discovery disputes in the case and in the absence of a certification of the close of fact discovery from the parties. Defendants' subpoena was issued before that date and Defendants have demonstrated that the requested documents could bear on their defenses as further explicated on the record.

Plaintiffs' motion to preclude (ECF No. 108, at 4-6) is denied, without prejudice to raise argument regarding the challenged documents in a motion in limine. As noted, fact discovery was open through 8/31/2023 (see 8/2/2023 ECF Order), and the parties did not certify the close of fact discovery until 9/7/2023 (see ECF No. 109 at 1). Accordingly, Defendants' document production of June 30, 2023, was timely and Plaintiffs had more than enough time to make additional discovery requests related to this production prior to the close of fact discovery.

The remaining deadlines for the completion of discovery remain in effect. Expert depositions shall be completed by 12/15/2023. All discovery shall be completed by 1/5/2024, and the parties shall submit a joint status report certifying the close of all discovery by 1/12/2024. The last date to take the first step in dispositive motion practice, in accordance with the Individual Rules of the assigned District Judge, shall be 2/12/2024. In the absence of dispositive motions, the Joint Pretrial Order shall be filed by 3/12/2024; the JPTO must be prepared in strict compliance with the rules of the assigned District Judge. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Taryn A. Merkl on 12/13/2023. (AT&T Log #11:30-12:50.) (ALG)

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-----X Docket#

STAR AUTO SALES OF : 18-cv-05775-ERK-TAM

BAYSIDE, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs, :

- versus - : U.S. Courthouse

: Brooklyn, New York
DYNOW, BAYARD, WHYTE AND :

VOYNOW, BAYARD, WHYTE AND : COMPANY, LLP, et al., :

: December 13, 2023

Defendants : 11:30 a.m.

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TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL CAUSE FOR STATUS CONFERENCE
BEFORE THE HONORABLE TARYN A. MERKL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

A P P E A R A N C E S: (VIA VIDEO/AUDIO)

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disputes.

2 Proceedings THE CLERK: ... Cause for a Status Conference, docket 18-cv-5775, Star Auto Sales of Bayside, Inc., et al. v. Voynow, Bayard, Whyte and Company, LLP, et al. Before asking the parties to state their appearance, I would like to note the following. Persons granted remote access to proceedings are reminded of the general prohibition against photographing, recording, and re-broadcasting of court proceedings. Violation of these prohibitions may result in sanctions including removal of court-issued media credentials, restricted entry to future hearings, denial of entry to future hearings, or any other sanctions deemed necessary by the Court. Will the parties please state their appearances for the record starting with the plaintiff? MR. FELSEN: Good morning, your Honor. This is Jamie Felsen. I'm joined here with Joseph Labuda and Jeremy Koufakis. MS. FITZGERALD: Good morning, your Honor. This is Maureen Fitzgerald on behalf of the defendants. THE COURT: All right. So good morning, everybody. We are here at long last hopefully on a final last-ditch effort to resolve some of these discovery

So I'm just curious to start, you know, kind of

3 Proceedings 1 where things stand with regard to what remains 2 outstanding in terms of the fact discovery. And I know 3 you're in the midst of expert practice as well. Rebuttal expert reports were due November 10th. 4 5 So would you like to start by providing an 6 overview, Mr. Felsen? 7 MR. FELSEN: Sure, your Honor. I'm happy to 8 report that we will be as of Monday finished with the expert depositions. As far as we're concerned, fact 9 10 discovery has been closed but for the four issues that 11 we're here to discuss today that are outlined in the 12 letter that we submitted. 13 THE COURT: Okay. So the last expert 14 deposition is Monday? 15 MR. FELSEN: Correct. 16 THE COURT: Okay. And so the four matters that 17 were outlined in your letter of September 7th on document 18 109, those are the only four issues that remain in your 19 point of view? MR. FELSEN: Yes. It essentially boils down to 20 21 two issues in document number 108, and then there's two issues in document number 102 on the docket. 22 23 THE COURT: Yes, that's what we gleaned from 24 following all of the connections between the documents. 25 Ms. Fitzgerald, can you give me an update from

4 Proceedings 1 defendant's perspective? MS. FITZGERALD: Well, I mean we largely agree. 2 3 We have the last expert deposition scheduled for Monday. 4 And there's four open issues between the docket filing 5 102 and docket filing 108 that the parties are prepared 6 to address today with your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Great. Just trying to make sure 8 we're all on the same page in terms of the order of the agenda and what we're on deck to discuss. 9 10 So as Mr. Felsen described, there were two 11 issues raised in the June 7th letter, document 102 in 12 ECF, one related to Star's request for documents 13 pertaining to demand number 9 as I understand it. 14 then the other issue pertaining to Star's fourth request 15 for documents pertaining to demand 6. 16 So would you like to start, Mr. Felsen? 17 Sure. You want me to address MR. FELSEN: 18 these two issues in document 102 first? Is that correct, 19 your Honor? THE COURT: I think we should probably go back 20 21 and forth on each issue. It's usually a little bit more 22 easy to follow. You want to start with demand 9 first 23 and the letter and then we'll turn to Ms. Fitzgerald for 24 her position? 25 MR. FELSEN: Sure, your Honor. With respect to

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document demand number 9 in plaintiff's second request for documents, so one of the hotly contested issues in this case is what the scope of work was during the engagement between Voynow -- that Voynow had with respect to the services it performed for Star. There is no written agreement so there's been a sharp factual dispute as to what exactly the scope of work was.

Now, with regard to demand number 9, it's our position that if other Voynow dealership clients had engagements that were for services other than just tax returns and they paid, those clients paid Voynow in the same manner and similar amounts as Star, it would be indicative that Star had the same engagements as those other dealership clients. And we're not asking for every single engagement. We've asked for a sample.

And we've met and conferred with Ms. Fitzgerald and we initially asked for the years 2013, 2015, a sampling of three. We then came to a compromise of 2014 and 2015. But then we weren't able to agree on anything further. We had requested that three dealership clients of Voynow for tax returns to be provided and three dealership clients where it was review services be provided.

Ms. Fitzgerald unilaterally just provided us with three engagements but for one auto group, Thompson

6 Proceedings auto group, who has various automobile dealerships within 1 2 that group. And she chose on her own. We want to be 3 able to a random sampling of ones that we choose. fine with Thompson but we want to receive engagement 4 5 letters for two other auto groups, Kerbeck Auto Group and 6 Peruzzi Auto Group. 7 THE COURT: Could you spell those for me? 8 MR. FELSEN: K-E-R-B-E-C-K, and Peruzzi, P-E-R-U-Z-Z-I. 9 10 In addition, to the extent that the engagement 11 letters do not provide information about the price was 12 for the engagement, then we'd ask that we receive 13 invoices also to provide us with information about what 14 those dealerships actually paid to Voynow. 15 THE COURT: How did you arrive at Kerbeck and 16 Peruzzi? 17 MR. FELSEN: Those were dealerships that there 18 was testimony about during depositions. 19 THE COURT: But how is it relevant. I mean we 20 talked about this, you know, at an in-person conference 21 months ago about how every client is different in 22 comparing documents of engagement with regard to one 23 client may be really apples and oranges compared to 24 another client depending on size, scope, need, volume of 25 business. Who knows which factors, right? That's why

7 Proceedings 1 accounting contracts and retainers are often very highly 2 customized, in my understanding. 3 So you know, we talked about this literally 4 months ago and so I'm curious, you know, where the 5 breakdown occurred with regard to the parties' 6 discussions because as of the June letter, it had been 7 represented that this issue was largely moot, that the 8 defendant had provide stuff and then now it seems as though you guys just disagree about what should be 9 10 provided. And I don't understand why you think you're 11 entitled to these specific clients. 12 MR. FELSEN: We believe that these dealership 13 groups are similar in size to Star, so therefore, it'll 14 be a good comparator to determine what the retainer says 15 and what was actually paid. 16 THE COURT: Do you have any sense of what work 17 they were hired to do? 18 MR. FELSEN: They had a review engagement those 19 two groups. 20 THE COURT: And how do you know that? 21 MR. FELSEN: I believe based on the deposition 22 testimony of a Voynow representative. 23 THE COURT: Okay. All right. So Ms. 24 Fitzgerald, would you like to respond? 25 MS. FITZGERALD: Sure. So first of all, I

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think we need to start with request number 9, the actual request, and the request asks for a sample of documents concerning Voynow's retainers or engagement letters with other dealerships. There's never been a request for invoices. It's been a sample of engagement letters.

And your Honor is right in the sense that we've been sort of around the block on this issue multiple times because what the plaintiffs are trying to do is almost create this type of comparator concept which is a concept that exists in employment discrimination cases. It is not a concept that exists in professional liability case law.

And I've repeatedly challenged them to come forward with any kind of law that supports the notion that they can get discovery about pulling out other clients located in a different state with different sets of books and records with different types of issues and argue that that is somehow relevant to the services the Voynow provided to star. And there is no law. They haven't been able to do that because it doesn't exist.

So I think that it's been my position all along that this has been nothing other than a fishing expedition but when we were in front of your Honor the last time, they argued that they needed the sample engagement letters involving Thompson Auto Group and they

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also wanted to depose the Thompson Auto Group controller.

And your Honor denied their request for that deposition

but then directed to me that to the extent I had

engagement letters from Thompson, those be documents that
I could produce. And I've done that.

I've given them two different engagement
letters involving the Thompson Group that pertains to a
review, financial state review engagement. And then I've
given them an engagement letter that involved 21
different entities that are affiliated with the Thompson
Group which is a large group that reflected the tax
engagement. So I've given that to them and now they're
coming back and saying oh, now this is the first time I'm
hearing about Kerbeck or Peruzzi and I can represent to
you that there's been no deposition testimony in any way
saying that Voynow provided services akin to a review or
something less than an audit or whatnot, or that there's
any similarity between those two entities and the Star
Group.

So I mean I think we have to go back to what the law says in terms of the fact that there is no concept of comparators in professional liability cases. This case is going to be decided upon the engagement letter and the plaintiffs are wrong when they say there is no engagement letters. There is engagement letters.

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They never signed them, but there are engagement letters.

So the jury is going to look to what's in the engagement letter and then they're going to look at Voynow's work papers as far as that shows what they did. What happened in a different state in a different type of engagement like an attestation engagement such as a financial statement review engagement, has no relevance whatsoever.

And even under the broad standard of relevance and Rule 26, you just can't justify allowing this type of discovery that has to do with, you know, Voynow's relationships with its other clients. Simply, it's so far outside the threshold of relevance. And I think when they wanted to make the point that there are different engagement letters that Voynow issued that pertain to reviews, and they have that now because I gave that to them in the Thompson documents and I gave them similar other engagement letters that have to do with tax only engagements. So they have that. They have that language. To now expand it to go on a fishing expedition for other Voynow clients is just well outside the scope of what's permissible.

And like I said, invoices have never ever -- were never even part of request number 9, so that should

11 Proceedings be just discarded, you know, right at the outset. 1 2 So that's our position, Judge. 3 THE COURT: Mr. Felsen --MR. FELSEN: Your Honor, may I respond? 4 5 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Felsen. 6 MR. FELSEN: May I respond briefly, your Honor? 7 THE COURT: Yes. I'm trying to make a record 8 of who's speaking, so please. Mr. Felsen, would you like 9 to respond? 10 MR. FELSEN: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. 11 With respect to invoices, we're not looking for 12 invoices to the extent that the engagement letters 13 identify the price. The only reason we are asking about 14 invoices is we want to know what the price is. So we 15 don't need every invoice. We just need to know how much 16 was paid under these retainers. 17 Scope of work is at the heart of this case here, so comparators are needed. We need to look at 18 19 other evidence since there's no written signed engagement 20 letter between the parties. So other discovery devices 21 are necessary. This is not a fishing expedition. We're 22 not asking for every single engagement letter. We've met 23 and conferred and all we're asking for is two other 24 dealership groups. We're not asking for every single 25 review engagement. That's not a fishing expedition.

12 Proceedings 1 We've narrowly tailored this to two dealerships. 2 THE COURT: So the Thompson documents are 3 sufficient? I mean first of all, do you take issue, Mr. 4 Felsen, with the representation that this is the first 5 time you're identifying Kerbeck and Peruzzi by name? 6 MR. FELSEN: Yes. We have (audio cut out) with 7 Ms. Fitzgerald those specific dealerships. She just gave 8 us Thompson. We had talked about giving other names but we didn't specifically identify them previously. 9 10 THE COURT: Okay. And why are the Thompson 11 documents insufficient? 12 MR. FELSEN: We'd like to have a sampling. 13 It's just one dealership group. THE COURT: But aren't there like 21 14 15 affiliates? Don't you now have the distinction between 16 the tax engagement and the tax and review engagement? 17 MR. FELSEN: Thompson is just one auto group 18 that she cherry picked. 19 THE COURT: That0's not responsive to my 20 question. Do you now have samples of the tax engagement 21 style and the larger style that includes the review 22 engagement? MR. FELSEN: Yes, through Thompson. 23 24 THE COURT: And why do you believe that 25 additional examples will in any way change the analysis?

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MR. FELSEN: Because Ms. Fitzgerald cherry picked Thompson and we don't know what the contents will be of these other auto groups' engagement letters.

And your Honor, you know, Ms. Fitzgerald by -THE COURT: But Mr. Felsen, this is like where
we were when you guys were performing at the beginning of
the summer. What does it matter if a different client
had a relationship with Voynow that provided them with
particular services? What matters to prove malpractice
here and the negligence here is what they were hired to
do here.

MR. FELSEN: Right. And your Honor, that's in dispute and --

THE COURT: I know it's in dispute, but what they did to a different client isn't going to change what conversations transpired between the principals of Star and the principals of Voynow.

MR. FELSEN: But the contents of an engagement letter for solely tax preparation work versus the contents of an engagement letter for review work, it would be different. And to the extent that the engagement letter for review work addresses duties that Voynow performed for Star, it would tend to establish that Star, like Thompson, had more than an engagement that covered more than just tax preparation.

14 Proceedings 1 THE COURT: But doesn't there need to be a 2 meeting of the minds here with regard to what the 3 contract should have included? What you essentially have 4 is a disconnect between the principals of Star and the 5 principals of Voynow, correct? 6 MR. FELSEN: Yes, your Honor. 7 THE COURT: I just really --8 MR. FELSEN: Your Honor --9 THE COURT: As I have struggled with it back in 10 May or June, whenever we were together, I'm still 11 struggling with the concept that a different contract is 12 going to shed any light whatsoever on what these parties 13 agreed to do here. 14 MR. FELSEN: Your Honor, there's also the 15 circumstances of the Thompson retainer is such that it's 16 dated 2015 but it's signed in 2017. We would be amenable 17 to one of these others that we pick, Kerbeck or Peruzzi. 18 And if you don't agree to one of those then some of the 19 auto group that we can pick. 20 THE COURT: Ms. Fitzgerald, would you like to 21 respond? 22 MS. FITZGERALD: I don't think that that 23 argument has any bearing on when the client actually 24 signed the engagement letter. They have the difference

in the wording of the two types of engagement. They have

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what's the standard tax engagement which is an entity that, was a letter that has to do with 21 different entities that I produced. Okay? So they have that level of service.

And then they have two samples of review engagements and two management representation letters that I also provided from the Thompson related entities. So they have the wording to the extent they even want to try to argue.

But the issue as far as what Voynow's engagement with Star is, that's going to be determined by the following. The actual letters that were issued between Star and Voynow irrespective of whether Star signed them. By the testimony of Michael Koufakis on one hand and Randy Franzen and his colleague who was present when the engagement was actually agreed to. Okay? So that's verbal testimony.

There's metadata that supports the existence of engagement letters issued every year by Voynow. There's references in bills and there's references in emails that support the existence of engagement letters being issued every year by Voynow. There's a change in format to those letters and the reason why. That's all in the testimony.

And then there's the fact that Star's owner,

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John Koufakis, admitted under oath that they don't sign contracts as a matter of course.

So the jury is going to hear all of that evidence. And that's the evidence, that's important evidence for the jury to decide whether or not this was a tax engagement and whether or not that -- because it doesn't, the letter doesn't have to be signed in the tax engagement. There is no requirement for it to be signed in order for the tax returns to be issued. But that's the evidence that the jury is going to hear and that's what the jury is going to decide. It has nothing to do with what Voynow issued to a different client in a different state for a different time period for a client that has different books and records. None of that has any bearing on what the scope of the engagement is between Star and Voynow.

THE COURT: Mr. Felsen?

MR. FELSEN: Your Honor, Ms. Fitzgerald gave us
Thompson. So by doing that she acknowledged that it's
relevant. And she doesn't get to pick and choose -THE COURT: No, she did not, Mr. Felsen. She
has never acknowledged it's relevant. I was there at the

23 oral argument. Go ahead.

MR. FELSEN: I don't believe you directed her to produce Thompson. That was something that she agreed

17 Proceedings 1 to during a meet and confer. MS. FITZGERALD: Yes. That was the one that 2 3 you requested specifically so I agreed to give you 4 Thompson. 5 THE COURT: The fact that she gave you 6 documents through a negotiated discovery process is not 7 evidence of her views on relevance. Do not make that 8 mistake. 9 MR. FELSEN: Understood, your Honor. Just with 10 respect to Ms. Fitzgerald's belief as to what evidence 11 the jury will consider, I mean that doesn't exclude us 12 from getting other relevant information. She doesn't get 13 to just choose what's relevant and what's not relevant. 14 I mean we're entitled to relevant documents and we 15 believe that this other engagement letter from another 16 dealership is relevant. 17 THE COURT: What's the payment arrangement that 18 Thompson utilizes, Mr. Felsen? 19 MR. FELSEN: The engagement doesn't contain 20 information about the payments. 21 THE COURT: You don't know whether it's a 22 monthly retainer or a particular set fees depending on 23 the level of service? 24 MR. FELSEN: No, your Honor. 25 MS. FITZGERALD: So there was testimony on this

18 Proceedings 1 issue, Judge, by Voynow's managing partner and he said 2 that all Voynow clients, regardless of the level of 3 engagement, are billed on a retainer as the work is done 4 and billed, it's offset against that retainer. So all clients are billed in that manner. And that's just 5 6 because, you know, accountants' work is typically 7 seasonal so that's how they stay afloat. 8 THE COURT: And one follow-up for Mr. Felsen, do you take issue with the representation by Ms. 9 10 Fitzgerald that engagement letters need not be signed 11 under the AICPA quidelines for tax engagement? 12 MR. FELSEN: We don't agree with Ms. 13 Fitzgerald's conclusion on that. 14 THE COURT: You don't. 15 MS. FITZGERALD: Well, their expert just 16 testified that he agreed. 17 THE COURT: I mean the AICP guidelines I assume 18 are in plain English. I can pull them up right now. So 19 what is your view on what the AICPA guidelines require 20 with respect to tax engagement specifically, Mr. Felsen? 21 MR. FELSEN: Our understanding is that once an 22 engagement letter is issued it's signed by the client. 23 THE COURT: On page 14 of document ECF 102, I 24 assume the defendant's position on this issue, the 25 defendants posit that the AICPA did not and still does

19 Proceedings 1 not mandate that a taxpayer sign tax engagement letters 2 before tax accountants can issue their tax return. 3 so Voynow never chased after them essentially is how I 4 reading this for the signed engagement letter. Is that a 5 fair read of your argument, Ms. Fitzgerald? 6 MS. FITZGERALD: That's correct. I mean the 7 AICPA recommends but does not require. And that's 8 different from financial statement engagements such as a review or an audit. And there, the AICPA mandates that 9 10 you have both a signed engagement letter and a signed 11 management representation letter from the client. 12 THE COURT: Mr. Felsen, would you like to be 13 heard on this? 14 MR. FELSEN: Our position is that this wasn't 15 just a tax engagement and it was a review engagement and 16 therefore it had to be signed. 17 THE COURT: I understand that but that's not 18 what this letter says, correct? 19 MS. FITZGERALD: The letter says it's only a 20 tax engagement, yes. 21 THE COURT: I mean you take issue with the 22 letter. You're saying they never signed the letter, they 23 didn't agree to it. They understood the scope of work to 24 be something different. I understand that is your 25 argument. But under the Rules of Professional

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1 Responsibility governing accountants, they were not required to chase after your client for a signature if 2 3 they understood it to be a tax engagement. Correct, Mr. Felsen?

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MR. FELSEN: If it was a tax engagement, But again, your Honor, our clients didn't receive -- the testimony from our clients is they never received these letters and there's no evidence that our clients received them.

MS. FITZGERALD: We would disagree with that. Initially the letters were sent to the three brothers individually for each of their companies that they own. And one of the brothers, John Koufakis, told our clients hey, instead of doing it this way, put them all, after getting the letter, put them all on a single letter. So put all the Star companies on a single letter and then address it to Michael Koufakis. So that was done. paper trail reflects a change in the format which was done at the request of John Koufakis. Michael Koufakis admitted that he got at least the 2016 letter and he does not know or does not recall whether or not he got the other letters. You know, we can get into what the evidence is going to show as far as the documents that Star definitely got from Voynow and the fact that they haven't produced those in discovery in this case. But I

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mean I think that's getting a little bit far off what 1 2 we're talking about today. But there's going to be 3 substantial evidence introduced showing that Star did in fact get these letters. But I think for purposes of our 4 5 discussion today, the point is that they have the sample 6 format of what a review engagement letter looks like and 7 they have the sample format of what a tax engagement looks like because I gave that to them through the 8 9 Thompson entity which is the entity that they definitely 10 requested they wanted. I don't think it's relevant but I 11 gave it to them. 12 We don't need to go any further on that. Wе 13 don't need to now bring in other entities that I'm 14 hearing about for the very first time that are unrelated 15 to Star. 16 THE COURT: Ms. Fitzgerald, Ms. Fitzgerald, I 17 didn't ask you a question and I'm really not even sure 18 what you're talking about. I was about to make a ruling 19 and I was speaking when you started speaking and I truly 20 am not clear on what you're trying to say. 21 MS. FITZGERALD: Sorry, I'm sorry, your Honor. I didn't realize. I thought you had wanted to hear from 22

me but I apologize if not.

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THE COURT: So as I was starting to say, this issue has been pending now for many months and we've been

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going around, the parties have been going around in circles trying to find some solution with little success. In the June 7, 2023 motion, the plaintiffs requested that the Court direct defendants to produce, and I quote, "written engagement agreements between Voynow and a sample of other dealerships who retained Voynow to perform solely tax preparation work and also to perform

That is on page 3 of ECF number 102. That motion stated that the parties agree that the defendants would produce three sample tax only agreements and three sample agreements for tax and review services.

work separate and apart from solely tax preparation."

As of September 7, 2023, plaintiffs contended that the defendants produced only engagement letters from the Thompson Auto Group and no other automotive groups and claimed that the defendants provided no rationale for limiting their production to Thompson Auto Group.

We've now discussed the history of this for a length of time today and the distinction between the types of engagements that are represented in the Thompson Auto Group documents. And I frankly do not think any further discovery on this issue is warranted. The question of engagement letters with respect to other entities is not proportional to the needs of this case where the issues pertain to the agreement that was in

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place between Star and Voynow. The fact that you now have some samples seems more than sufficient given the very, very minimal relevance of this particular class of documents.

So the court is not inclined to order that the defendants have to produce any further written engagements between Voynow and a sample of other dealerships.

I also note that the parties did not even meet and confer on the specific request that the plaintiff is now positing as the documents they're seeking. You acknowledged just moments ago, Mr. Felsen, that you had never requested specifically in a meet and confer the documents for Kerbeck and Peruzzi and I deny the request on that grounds as well. So we're done with this particular issue.

Turning now to demand number 6, Mr. Felsen, would you like to start?

MR. FELSEN: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. So demand number 6, in demand number 6 we're looking for documents concerning checklists Voynow used regarding review engagements for auto dealer clients as referenced in David Kumar's deposition. Mr. Kumar is an employee for Voynow.

Michael Koufakis testified on behalf of the

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plaintiff that his understanding of the engagement as explained to him by the principals of Voynow was that the engagement would be more than an audit, I'm sorry, more than a review and less than an audit.

Mr. Kumar testified at Exhibit 3, pages 140 to 141 of the deposition that when Voynow performed review engagements, it used checklists. Voynow's argument principally is that Star isn't entitled to this because Voynow's position is that it only prepared tax returns. Obviously, that's not the case. There's been no ruling on that particular issue and that's one of the primary issues in this case.

So Voynow, throughout the litigation and at the deposition, has tried to relate all tasks that it performed for Star to preparation of tax returns. But if there are certain tasks that are contained on these checklists that Voynow used for review clients, if on those checklists it identifies tasks that are being done by Star, it would tend to establish that Voynow was actually doing that work for Star.

So it's entirely relevant. It's critical to the central issue in this case related to what the scope of work was.

Also, I just want to note for the Court that they produced another type of checklist in discovery. It

25 Proceedings 1 was a checklist related to the tasks for controllers. 2 We're not looking for confidential client information. 3 All we're looking for is the checklist. They can redact any information related to the identity of any Voynow 4 5 But this is entirely relevant and we'd ask that 6 the Court direct Voynow to produce this checklist. 7 THE COURT: So this checklist question really is someone ephemeral to me, right? Because it seems as 8 though, you know, the production of checklists for a 9 10 separate client could be somewhat problematic. And I 11 wonder, the question about a blank checklist, whether 12 that actually provides me much insight. 13 So would you be satisfied with a blank 14 checklist? That's what you say on page 5 of ECF 102. 15 Star --16 MR. FELSEN: Yes. 17 The blank form checklist is what THE COURT: 18 Star is seeking, not any checklist for client 19 information. 20 MR. FELSEN: Correct, your Honor. 21 THE COURT: So Ms. Fitzgerald, does such a 22 document exist? Is there like a template that Voynow 23 uses to prepare checklists for when they go out on an 24 engagement? 25 MS. FITZGERALD: So those types of blank

26 Proceedings 1 documents can be pulled right off the AICPA website. And 2 I think, I mean the plaintiffs actually did that when they submitted I think it's Exhibit 9 to one of their --3 I think it's two docket 102. Exhibit 9 is a blank AICPA 4 5 checklist for a tax engagement. So they're looking for a 6 blank --7 I understand that there are THE COURT: 8 publicly available checklists but that is not my 9 question, Ms. Fitzgerald. MS. FITZGERALD: Yeah. I don't know that 10 11 Voynow has any checklists that are not already with 12 client's specific information on them. 13 THE COURT: I find that hard to believe, Ms. 14 Fitzgerald because --15 MS. FITZGERALD: I'm sorry? 16 THE COURT: I find that really hard to believe 17 because I have yet to meet a company or office or, you 18 know, division that doesn't create their own internal 19 templates. 20 MS. FITZGERALD: So I quess what I was trying 21 to say is whether or not they could get that, like 22 download it from the AICPA website as a blank document, 23 probably, yeah. But as I understood the question, the 24 request that they were looking for, they were looking for 25 the checklists that were actually used in actual review

27 Proceedings 1 engagements for other clients. 2 THE COURT: You're telling me that the Voynow 3 accountants literally pull of the AICPA website when they go out for an engagement? I don't buy it. 4 5 MS. FITZGERALD: So they are --6 THE COURT: They don't maintain a blank 7 checklist? 8 MS. FITZGERALD: It's a publication. I want to say it's Pearson that publicizes these checklists that 9 10 accountants use. 11 THE COURT: I'm asking you whether or not 12 Voynow has a template for their own internal checklists. 13 MS. FITZGERALD: They have this published 14 document that's put out by another entity. It's not an 15 internal Voynow template. 16 THE COURT: I reviewed a fair amount of 17 accounting records back when I was a white-collar 18 prosecutor and I have not seen most accountants utilize 19 like publicly available published forms, Ms. Fitzgerald, 20 and I'm really struggling to credit -- I'm not saying 21 that you are representing anything. I'm just wondering 22 if you know the answer. Are you sure that Voynow doesn't 23 have an internal template? 24 MS. FITZGERALD: The templates are -- and 25 there's been testimony about this, Judge. So it's a

28 Proceedings 1 company, and I believe it's Pearson, that publishes these 2 documents. So that's the template that -- it's a 3 publication by the company that lists the template. And I think if you look at the template that 4 5 the plaintiff attached as a blank one, you can see that it's a publication that's put out by another entity. So 6 7 there's not a Voynow specific oh this is what we do in a review engagement. It's a publication that, you know, it 8 has a checklist and accountants go through it and they 9 10 decide okay, is this a relevant step for this particular 11 client for this particular engagement? And if so, you 12 know, they would follow that step. But it's not a Voynow 13 specific generated template. It's something that's 14 published by another party used by accountants. 15 THE COURT: Mr. Felsen, do you have any 16 evidence to suggest that they don't just use the standard 17 public form? 18 MR. FELSEN: Yes, your Honor. Mr. Kumar's 19 testimony, Exhibit 3 on page 141, he testified --20 THE COURT: Exhibit 3 to what? Exhibit 3 to ECF number? 21 22 MR. FELSEN: I'm sorry, it's document 102-3. 23 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 24 MR. FELSEN: On page 141. 25 THE COURT: Let me just get there. My computer

29 Proceedings 1 is being very, very slow to open this PDF here. Hold on. 2 Give me one second. You said page 141? 3 MR. FELSEN: Page 141 at the top on line 1 4 It says, "We would follow checklists. The 5 checklists change from year to year." So based on his 6 testimony, there's a different checklist each year. 7 And in addition, your Honor, the checklist --8 THE COURT: What about that suggests that's not the AICPA checklist? 9 10 MR. FELSEN: Your Honor, that doesn't 11 specifically say whether it's the AICPA checklist or not. 12 But the point is that they had a different checklist each 13 year that they used. 14 And when you also look at the fact that the 15 controller checklist has Voynow's name at the top and 16 bottom of it, it would show that Voynow, when they use 17 checklists, they put their name on it. 18 So we would ask that they produce the 19 checklists that they use that their name is on. And if 20 their name is not on it and they use the AICPA checklist, 21 then they should confirm that. It doesn't seem like Ms. 22 Fitzgerald is fully aware as you can hear today. 23 THE COURT: I'm looking at Exhibit 8 and 9. 24 Give me one second. 25 MR. FELSEN: Your Honor, the checklist for the

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controller says at the top dealership internal control checklist and it's got Voynow's name at the bottom.

THE COURT: I know. That's what I'm looking at, documents 8 and 9.

So how do these checklists interrelate with the checklists that we're talking about, Ms. Fitzgerald, if you know?

MS. FITZGERALD: So Exhibit 9 is a 2021 tax return S Corporation checklist. Okay? What Mr. Kumar was asked about at his deposition was, you know, what types of engagement he worked on when he was at Voynow and he said, you know, he had done tax engagements and he had also done review engagements. He made very clear that for Star it was only a tax engagement. But to the extent that he did work on review engagements for other clients, he talked about the fact that there were checklists that were used for those types of engagements that were 40 to 60 pages.

And you know, to the extent Mr. Felsen is arguing that those checklist changed every year, well, those checklists would have the year of the financial statement engagement. So whether it was 2015 or 2016, that would be reflected on the year of the checklist.

 $\label{eq:control_control_control} \mbox{I believe that -- I think that answers your} \\ \mbox{question.}$

31 Proceedings 1 THE COURT: Not exactly, no. So you know, 2 Exhibit 8 is a different type of checklist than Exhibit 9 3 and it does have Voynow's name at the top and the 4 bottom --5 MS. FITZGERALD: Yes. 6 THE COURT: -- of the first page. And my 7 question was how do these checklists interrelate with the 8 checklists that you understand plaintiff to be seeking? 9 MS. FITZGERALD: Yes. 10 THE COURT: So you know, the Exhibit 9 11 checklist in fact does appear to be an AICPA checklist 12 for income tax return preparation. Fine. 13 MS. FITZGERALD: Right. 14 THE COURT: You get this online. 15 MS. FITZGERALD: So okay --16 THE COURT: The question is with regard to 17 Exhibit 8, I mean to me if Voynow has a blank checklist, 18 you should just produce it and we should be done with 19 this. I think we just need an answer to the question of 20 whether or not Voynow was in the practice of preparing 21 their own internal checklist or literally just went to 22 AICPA and printed out a form each time. 23 MS. FITZGERALD: Yes. So for the review 24 engagement, that would be a similar type of publication, 25 whether it's the Pearson company that I believe is what

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the testimony said similar to what is on Exhibit 9. Exhibit 8, so that document came about after Star fired their two controllers. In 2017, they asked Voynow to assist the new controller that they hired because she had no experience. So this was a document -- this is not an accountant, procedures that accountants do. This was a document that is in your capacity as a dealer, as a controller, these are things you should be doing as part of your job. So that's the difference between the two documents. THE COURT: Right. But I still don't have an answer as to whether Voynow created any internal checklist or literally just used the AICPA forms each time. MS. FITZGERALD: Yes. So it is the form that they used. And they would tailor it as needed to the particular type of review engagement that they were on, but it's not --THE COURT: What do you mean they would tailor it? It's a standard form. How do they tailor it?

it? It's a standard form. How do they tailor it?

MS. FITZGERALD: So like for instance, let's

just say, you know, there is a -- and I'm just

hypothetically thinking, but just say on a checklist

there's petty cash. If a client doesn't have petty cash,

then that would be something that you would just mark N/A

33 Proceedings as you're completing the checklist as an accountant. 1 2 know, or if an accountant, you know, if the company 3 doesn't have like a certain type of inventory, you know, you would skip over something like that. You tailor it 4 5 as needed to your client, but that's how it's tailored to 6 a client's specific engagement. 7 THE COURT: What you're saying is internally inconsistent to some extent, Ms. Fitzgerald. By saying 8 they're tailoring the checklist, you're suggesting that 9 10 they're editing it. 11 MS. FITZGERALD: No, I'm just saying you skip 12 over it. Like you don't complete it. 13 THE COURT: No, but that's what you are 14 literally saying, ma'am, with all respect. When you just 15 say N/A, you're not tailoring the checklist. You're 16 filling it out as not applicable. There's a very 17 different meaning. 18 And so what I'm trying to get at is whether or 19 not there is evidence in this case that the AICPA 20 checklists were the ones utilized for both potential 21 types of review here, the tax engagement and/or the 22 review engagement. 23 MS. FITZGERALD: So the testimony and the work 24 papers make clear that there were no checklists used for

the tax engagement. They're not required to --

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34 Proceedings 1 THE COURT: Totally not responsive to my 2 question. My question is is there evidence in this case 3 about Voynow's practices with regard to checklist 4 utilization with regard to tax engagement and the review 5 engagement? Where did the checklist come from? 6 MS. FITZGERALD: So the evidence is they were 7 asked do you use checklists for tax engagements? The 8 answer is no. 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MS. FITZGERALD: Do you use checklists for 11 review engagements? The answer was yes. And that was 12 what Mr. Kumar's testimony had to do it. 13 THE COURT: Right. Mr. Kumar's testimony is 14 ambiguous as to where the checklists originate. Is there 15 evidence in the case with regard to where they get their 16 checklists? 17 MS. FITZGERALD: Yes. And that's what I'm 18 trying to pull up. And it was a publication and that's 19 where the name Pearson is coming up. And I can't recall 20 specifically which deposition it was, but one of the 21 Voynow folks explained that that's where they get the 22 checklists that they use. It's published by a third 23 party. 24 THE COURT: Mr. Felsen, do you recall which

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deposition that was?

MR. FELSEN: Not off the top of our heads, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I can't order Ms. Fitzgerald to produce something that doesn't exist, Mr. Felsen. If it is true that Voynow utilized the AICPA checklist for their review engagement consistently and that was their standard practice, which actually makes sense to some degree for a small firm not to reinvent the wheel, but I can't possibly weigh in on what their actual business practice was.

All of that being said, I can't order her to produce something that doesn't exist. If there's testimony and evidence in the case that they did not use checklists for tax engagements, there will be no checklists to produce in that regard. If the evidence in the case indicates that they used the AICPA form for their review engagements, they don't have an internal document to produce that wouldn't have client information on it.

So you have Exhibit 9. It appears to be one of the AICPA forms. What I'm going to direct the parties to do once again is to meet and confer on this issue and please drill down with your client, Ms. Fitzgerald, and if you need to put it in a declaration or an interrogatory or something to close out this issue,

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please do so. But we need a definitive answer about whether or not Voynow had their own internal blank checklists that the accountants would use for review engagements or whether or not they were simply using the AICPA form. Is that clear to you, Ms. Fitzgerald? Do you understand what I'm saying?

MS. FITZGERALD: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So on this issue, the plaintiff's request for the documents in the motion that I ordered defendants to provide them is denied without prejudice because I don't have sufficient evidence before me to establish that the documents exist. But I am directing the parties to meet and confer to confirm whether or not -- to confirm what Voynow's business practice was. If there was a checklist, Ms. Fitzgerald, please provide it. If there was no checklists, please come up with some sort of a workaround to have that fact documented in the discovery record whether it is one quick interrogatory or declaration. We have to close this issue out. Ms. Fitzgerald, does that work for you?

MS. FITZGERALD: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. So the next two issues that were raised pertain to the filing that was made in August, document 108.

First was a motion to quash a subpoena to

37 Proceedings Withum, plaintiff's current accounting firm. So again, 1 2 Mr. Felsen, this is your motion. Would you like to 3 start? Thank you, your Honor. So I MR. FELSEN: Yes. 4 5 just want to go through some quick procedural history 6 relating to discovery. 7 On December 5, 2022, the Court ordered fact discovery closed as of March 17, 2023 and all discovery 8 closed on August 18, 2023. 9 10 A few months later, March 28, 2023, the Court 11 entered an order reiterating that the March 17, 2023 12 deadline remains and ordered the parties to meet and 13 confer and try to resolve some pending discovery 14 disputes. 15 Then we fast forward to July 25, 2023. Star 16 submitted a letter asking for more time to complete 17 expert discovery only and proposed dates for expert 18 disclosures as well as expert depositions. Star didn't 19 ask to extend fact discovery. Voynow certainly didn't. 20 Voynow has adamantly and strenuously opposed every 21 attempt by Star to extend the discovery deadline, the 22 fact discovery deadline. 23 The Court entered an order on August 2, '23 24 stating that fact discovery must be completed by August 25 31, 2023 and set a schedule for expert discovery. In

1 | that order, the Court did not reopen fact discovery.

2 | There was merely some miscellaneous discovery items that

3 | needed to be done. There was nothing before the Court

asking any party, including Voynow, asking for the Court

to allow new discovery to take place such as the issuance

6 of subpoenas. The spirit of the order was that no new

discovery would take place, that August 31st was the

deadline to finish up whatever was outstanding.

Ms. Fitzgerald, on April, I'm sorry, August
4th, four and a half months after the March 17, 2023
close of discovery, served a subpoena on Withum, who is
Star's current accountant, and by doing so Ms. Fitzgerald
circumvented the August 2, 2023 order.

Now, the substance of the subpoena, so we believe that the subpoena should be quashed based solely on the fact that it was served after the close of discovery. But even if the Court were to entertain that subpoena, which we don't think it should, the subpoena should be quashed because it seeks information that's not relevant.

So Withum came up at a deposition of Michael Koufakis back in August of 2022, a year before (audio cut out) on August 4, 2023. So it's clear that Voynow could have served that subpoena and didn't, for whatever reason did not, and forgot to, and then took the opportunity

based on its August 2nd order to now engage in new discovery. They had plenty of time to serve that subpoena during discovery and they failed to do so.

Now, the substance of that subpoena is for engagement letters, invoices, and bills for the period of 2020 through 2021. That information that they sought has nothing to do with the claims in this case. Withum became Star's accountant in 2020, years after the alleged acts in the complaint. The complaint alleges malpractice up through November 2017. Withum didn't become the accountant for three years.

Withum (audio cut out) after Voynow was terminated simply has no connection to Voynow's retainer. What Star did subsequently with respect to the accounting services that it received from accountants has no bearing whatsoever on this case. Also --

THE COURT: Isn't it somewhat analogous to your argument that what your relationship was with your subsequent accountant is perhaps reflective of your relationship with your prior accountant? Isn't that somewhat analogous to comparing the practices that Voynow undertook with other clients, what we started the day with?

MR. FELSEN: And your Honor ruled in favor of Ms. Fitzgerald on that. So if you believe it's

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   comparable then --
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              THE COURT:
                          After you got some discovery, sir.
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              MR. FELSEN: So, if you believe it's
    comparable, then --
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              THE COURT: After you got some discovery, sir.
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              MR. FELSEN: But your Honor, we're looking for
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   engagements during the time that -- we were looking for
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   engagements during the time that Star was being serviced
   by Voynow. They are now looking for engagements three
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   years after the malpractice took place with respect to a
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   totally different accounting firm.
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              THE COURT:
                          I understand. All right. Ms.
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   Fitzgerald?
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              MR. FELSEN: Just one more comment, your Honor.
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   Ms. Fitzgerald is looking for information related to
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   pricing and we just don't think that you can compare
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   Withum, a large international accounting firm with
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   Voynow, who's a regional accounting firm based in
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   Pennsylvania with less than ten employees. You just
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   can't compare. That's like comparing, you know, my firm
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   to one of these huge national law firms. It's just
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   not -- our rates aren't comparable to a huge law firm
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   like that.
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              THE COURT: I understand the argument.
                                                       Ms.
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   Fitzgerald?
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MS. FITZGERALD: So first, let me address the argument as to the discovery deadline. Plaintiffs had made numerous requests to extend that deadline and we did object, and the Court ruled in plaintiff's favor extending that deadline. So the Court's order issued on August 2nd extends the fact discovery deadline to August 31st. There's no limitations, restrictions, or qualifications in that order as far as fact discovery.

argue that only certain limited discovery was permitted after March, well that argument doesn't hold because the plaintiffs disclosed a brand new witness for the first time at the end of June. The plaintiffs produced almost 5,000 documents in mid to late August. So both parties have engaged in fact discovery after that March deadline and that's consistent with the Court's order allowing discovery to take place up through August 31st.

So as to the second part of Mr. Felsen's argument, which is essentially that the subpoena seeks information that's not relevant, we disagree. First of all, the subpoena is very narrowly tailored. It only asks for two years of engagement letters and invoices.

And the reason why it's relevant is because, as has been alluded to throughout today, that there's a dispute between Michael Koufakis's version as to what he

hired outside accountants for versus Voynow's version.

So I took his deposition and the deposition was taken in August of 2022. So at that point, Withum was already engaged for over two years. And Mr. Koufakis testified that with regard to Voynow, he had hired them to conduct services just shy of an actual audited financial statement. He hired them to actually detect fraud and to actually verify every balance in every account on the balance sheet. And he said that that was what he hired Voynow to do for a 21-year period and that he had also hired Voynow's predecessor to provide that same level of service.

So basically, you have Mr. Koufakis testifying that for 30 years his outside accountant provided this significant level of service. And when I asked him what he was engaged -- what Withum was engaged to provide, his testimony was that oh, it's a fluid situation. I really don't recall. But he was the one who would have hired them.

And I think that we should be able to challenge his credibility because when you look at the fact that he's claiming that between 2017 and 2021 he discovered allegedly \$10 million worth of theft or fraud that was committed that supposedly wasn't detected by Voynow, and that on top of it there was an investigation by the New

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York Attorney General against Star for Star employees defrauding customers, Chinese customers -- so you have that that occurred, that also occurred around 2018 through 2020. So you have these two big alleging fraud activities and now you're going to claim that you only hired Withum to do something that is so far below the level of an audit engagement?

I mean it's our belief, and I'm 99 percent sure, that if the Court allows this subpoena, I'm going to get those engagement letters and they're going to show that it's a tax only engagement. So that, given the context of what's happened with this fraud, that undercuts Michael Koufakis's credibility because why would you go from such a high level of outside accountant services for 30 plus years and now you have supposedly all this massive fraud and you now scale it back to where you just have a tax engagement that is not intended to detect fraud?

So it's relevant to address his credibility, first of all. And then it's also relevant because the fraud, some of the fraud that is at issue actually is alleged to have occurred up through 2020 and was not discovered until either 2020 or 2021 which falls in the scope of Withum's engagement. So if Withum, I mean if Star is to believe that they hired Withum to do the same

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type of level of attestation engagement that it did hire Voynow and the prior accountant, then there's an issue as to why Withum couldn't discover that type of fraud because it was only discovered by, you know, their current office manager who isn't even an accountant and who doesn't even have, you know, any education beyond high school.

So you have accountants who are professionals who supposedly aren't discovering this so-called fraud. It's relevant to the extent that how discoverable was this fraud or even is there a fraud? So again, the subpoena is very narrowly tailored.

And then the third piece as to why it's relevant, as to why we've asked for the invoices, is that the plaintiff's theory is that because of Voynow's bills that supposedly reflects that they did more than tax work.

And their expert made that plain. And when I took his deposition, I asked him what support he had to back up that opinion and he basically said well, you know, my own accounting firm would issue the tax work for dealerships back in 2015. And when I tried to ask him, you know, what was the type of clients, what was the size of the dealership, you know, where was the dealership located so that we could actually make some type of

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comparison, he wouldn't disclose any of that information.

So if the Court allows me to get Withum's bills and if Withum's bills reflect that it was only a tax engagement, as I suspect that they will, and if those bills are comparable to what Voynow's bills were, then that supports our defense and it rebuts the plaintiff's claim that Voynow's bills suggest something more than a tax engagement.

THE COURT: So then the question of the monetary compensation, I mean didn't we discuss this at length in the context of the other engagement that the price may or may not have any relevance depending upon their pay structure? I mean I don't know that the money matters. I understand your argument with regards to the scope of the engagement, but I'm not completely sold on the invoices at all, Ms. Fitzgerald. How is it not Mr. Felsen's argument that a regional accounting firm may have very different rates than the national? They could be less, they could be more depending upon whether the larger firm has economy to scale. Paul Weiss is not comparable to a law firm in rural Pennsylvania.

MS. FITZGERALD: Right. So what the invoices would show, and I agree that there's variation in rates, but what the invoices would show is if this was a tax engagement, then you would have invoices that reflect a

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tax claiming visit at one point of the year. You would have invoices that reflect a tax preparation visit at one point of the year. And then you would have invoices that reflect an interim year tax visit. So the invoices would reflect and support when it was that Withum was actually out there. And to the extent it matches up with the same type of three visits per year that Voynow was out there, then it does support, you know, irrespective if let's just say Withum bills at a higher hourly rate than Voynow did, the invoices are going to be relevant to support the scope of the engagement being those three types of on site visits.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Felsen?

MR. FELSEN: Yes, your Honor. So Voynow has in their possession (indiscernible) and invoices from another accounting firm, Rosenfield, that Star used subsequent to Voynow. So just like your Honor ruled with respect to demand number 9 where it was sufficient for Star to just have Thompson engagement, I respectfully submit that that should be the ruling here, that they already have Rosenfield and they shouldn't be entitled to anything else.

With respect to Mr. Koufakis's testimony, he testified that he uses other accounting firms and not exclusively Withum.

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Also, Ms. Fitzgerald made a statement about a new witness that Star subsequently identified after discovery. We only learned about that witness at a 30(b)(6) deposition that took place after the initial deadline for discovery. So that's the reason why that individual was identified.

MS. FITZGERALD: So just as to the Rosenfield piece, so Rosenfield was hired to conduct a forensic accounting analysis. So that's different. They were hired, you know, after the alleged discovery of the alleged theft and they were also hired for purposes of being an expert in this case. So those types of bills aren't really comparable or reflective of what your prototypical tax engagement would have looked like.

THE COURT: Mr. Felsen, anything in response?

MR. FELSEN: Your Honor, Rosenfield did tax

work also. And your Honor, to the extent that they're

allowed this, it's going to prejudice us because, you

know, there's no -- discovery is closed and, you know,

they're going to get this and that's the end of it?

There's no further discovery on this issue? Their time

to get this has well passed. They should have asked for

this a long time ago. We would have objected back then.

But due to the fact that they requested this after

discovery closed, it should be rejected based on that ground alone.

THE COURT: I understand both sides' arguments. So starting first with the argument as to timing, I would just like to note that in the August 21, 2023 motion by plaintiff, plaintiff's sought to quash the subpoena served on Withum, plaintiff's current accounting firm, as both untimely and irrelevant. That's in the motion to quash the subpoena at ECF 108.

Plaintiffs seem to argue that the Court unintentionally extended the deadline to close fact discovery when the Court was only requested to extend the deadline for expert discovery. That's suggested in the motion at ECF 108 at page 2.

Plaintiffs further argue that the subpoena seeks the relevant documents because the documents requested are outside the time frame of the relationship between plaintiff and defendants.

In response, defendants point to the Court's August 2, 2023 order stating that the close of fact discovery would be August 31, 2023 and note that the defendants issued the subpoena with a return date of August 21, 2023 and the defendants explained why the requested documents are relevant supplemented by Ms. Fitzgerald's arguments made here today.

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As a timing matter, I would first note that plaintiff is incorrect that the Court erred in some fashion in extending the close of fact discovery. The Court's extension of the schedule was specific and based on an expressed request for an extension made by the plaintiff in document 104. And I quote from ECF 104, "This letter is written as a follow up to a portion of the June 7th letter regarding inter alia plaintiff's request for an extension of time for the completion of all discovery."

One prior request for an extension was made on December 2, 2022 and was granted. The December 2, 2022 extension was made in the filing made by plaintiff's counsel docketed at ECF number 78 in which the plaintiffs requested an extension of fact discovery.

I did at one point note on the record while we were together that I was not extending the fact discovery schedule in toto at that point in time. But given all of the events that transpired over the summer and given plaintiff's request, express request that I extend the deadline for the close of all discovery, we entered a responsive scheduling order over defendant's objection.

After that time, the parties had ample opportunity all throughout the summer to certify the close of fact discovery notwithstanding discreet open

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issues and continuously declined to do so. Whether or not the plaintiffs intended to request an extension of the close of fact discovery in their letter, the Court nonetheless ordered it on the basis of the fact that there were so many messy issues that I was aware of that were percolating over the summer. My order clearly and unequivocally extended the close of fact discovery to August 31, 2023. No party objected to it. Had anybody wanted a clarification, it could have been requested. Nothing was made in that regard. I do find that the defendant's subpoena was issued prior to the close of fact discovery.

In addition, I find the defendants have carried their burden to demonstrate that the requested documents could bear on their defenses including, but not limited to, challenging the credibility of an important witness, specifically Michael Koufakis.

Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to quash the subpoena is denied.

The next issue that we had was the defendant's motion to preclude. And my question to you, Ms.

Fitzgerald, is isn't this really a proper motion for later on in the case as a motion in limine? Why is this before me now?

MS. FITZGERALD: It's actually the plaintiff's

51 Proceedings 1 motion and I agree with your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Go 3 ahead, Mr. Felsen. MR. FELSEN: Your Honor, the problem is is that 4 5 there's documents that Ms. Fitzgerald is attempting to 6 rely on and we're significantly prejudiced because if 7 they're allowed, we haven't had the opportunity to engage 8 in discovery on any of this. Ms. Fitzgerald snuck in four categories of documents with a 6,000 page document 9 10 production of documents for the most part where we had 11 agreed upon during the meet and confer that they would be 12 produced. 13 So to allow this to go forward without 14 plaintiffs having the opportunity to engage in further 15 discovery with respect to these four categories of 16 documents would be significantly prejudicial to the 17 plaintiffs. 18 THE COURT: You got them in June, right? 19 MR. FELSEN: June, yeah, we got them in June 20 and we filed a motion shortly thereafter, after we 21 believed discovery was over. 22 THE COURT: Your firm is the firm that 23 requested the extension of the discovery schedule which I 24 granted unequivocally in plain English on the docket. 25 MR. FELSEN: Your Honor, I respectfully

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disagree with your interpretation of our letter but I understand your ruling.

THE COURT: You also have to understand the docket order. It says unequivocally fact discovery is extended until August 31st. And I don't understand why that wasn't read literally in black and white, black and yellow as the case may be.

MR. FELSEN: Your Honor, the Court's orders were making a distinction between fact discovery and all discovery, and we referred to all discovery in our letter.

THE COURT: Fact discovery shall be completed by August 31, 2023. It is on the docket. You had a full month after August 2nd to the close of fact discovery to conduct any discovery you would have liked to do with regard to documents you received at the end of June.

MR. FELSEN: But that's not what we asked for in our letter. We asked for an extension on all discovery, not fact discovery.

THE COURT: Fact is encompassed within all discovery, sir. And I distinguished in my order what was being extended unequivocally. So I'm failing to understand how you did not have an opportunity to address these issues during discovery. You had the documents as of June 30th, correct?

53 Proceedings 1 (Pause in proceedings) 2 THE COURT: Mr. Felsen, are you there? 3 MR. FELSEN: I think I was on mute. The prior 4 orders that the Court issued made a distinction between 5 fact discovery and all discovery. And so in our letters, 6 we used the same terminology that the Court was using. 7 When we referred to all discovery, we were referring to 8 all discovery which the Court was referring to as expert 9 discovery. 10 THE COURT: Your letter and what you intended 11 to request specifically made reference to a prior extension of fact discovery that was requested in 12 13 December. I extended the schedule clearly and 14 unequivocally again breaking them down by categories. You didn't read my scheduling order. You didn't 15 16 understand my scheduling order. That is frankly not the 17 Court's responsibility to ensure. It is clear and 18 unequivocal that fact discovery was extended until August 19 31st. Did you or did you not receive these documents on 20 June 30th, sir? 21 MR. FELSEN: We received them on June 30th, 22 your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Okay. So you had two months from 24 the extension of the discovery schedule that was 25 predicated on receipt of your letter during which you

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1 could have explored the discovery issues that you think 2 are necessary to follow up on this production. Whether 3 you misunderstood because you had a different intention in writing the letter than what I ultimately ruled 4 doesn't matter, sir. The discovery schedule was clear. 6 And your interpretation of my discovery schedule is not 7 binding on the -- what you intended to request is not 8 binding on me.

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MR. FELSEN: Your Honor, we did not have an opportunity -- if you were to allow these documents to proceed at trial and wait for a motion in limine, we would be deprived of the opportunity to do depositions related to these documents.

THE COURT: Did you seek to take any depositions related to the documents after you received them in June?

MR. FELSEN: Your Honor, discovery was closed in June. We couldn't do anything.

THE COURT: Did you seek to take any discovery steps with regard to documents after I extended the fact discovery schedule on August 2nd?

MR. FELSEN: We didn't believe that -- we didn't understand the discovery deadline to be extended. We thought the expert discovery deadline was extended.

25 That was the main argument we made with respect to the

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Withum subpoena. It's not like I'm just making this up,
your Honor. That was our understanding and we identified
that understanding in our motion with respect to the
Withum subpoena on August 21st.

THE COURT: We had many, many letters and

correspondence over the summer regarding the pendency of various fact discovery disputes in this case. And my order from August 2nd is unequivocal. Plaintiff's letter motion for extension of time to complete discovery is granted in part in light of the lengthy history of discovery disputes in this case. That discovery shall be completed by August 31, 2023. The parties shall file a joint status report certifying the close of fact discovery by September 7, 2023. I don't understand how anyone could interpret that to mean anything other than the notion that fact discovery was extended.

So did you take any steps in August to do any work with regard to these documents?

MR. FELSEN: No, your Honor. We filed the letter on August 21st stating that we believe these documents were produced after the close of discovery.

THE COURT: And you knew that defendants disagreed with you. And if you had reviewed the scheduling order you would have plainly seen that they were right.

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MR. FELSEN: We didn't agree that they were right, your Honor. That's why we submitted the letter.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, there is no credible interpretation of that scheduling order other than the notion that fact discovery was extended. You may reserve your right to seek to preclude any documents later on in this case, but there's no basis to preclude documents during the discovery phase based upon the fact that you did not read my scheduling order.

So the motion to preclude the documents that were produced on June 30, 2023 is denied without prejudice to raise these issues as a motion in limine at the appropriate time.

If you have a further application with regards to these issues, you may make it but I don't know what that would be.

So at this point the four issues that were identified at the outset by the parties as the issues that remain outstanding have been addressed. Is there anything further that we should do today, Mr. Felsen?

MR. FELSEN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Fitzgerald?

MS. FITZGERALD: No, your Honor. But I do have a question. I guess a clarification really. To the extent that there are issues regarding preclusion of all

57 Proceedings or part of any expert report, am I correct that we should 1 2 be addressing those to the trial judge and not to you at 3 a later date? THE COURT: Are you anticipating that as a sort 4 5 of motion for summary judgment? 6 MS. FITZGERALD: Yes. 7 THE COURT: Then yes, it should be directed to 8 the district judge. 9 MS. FITZGERALD: Okay. All right. Thank you. 10 THE COURT: And with regard to the expert 11 schedule, it sounded as though the parties are on track 12 to complete the expert depositions on Monday. And from there, what, if anything, remains outstanding with 13 14 regards to discovery? Mr. Felsen, starting with you. 15 think you're on mute again, sir. 16 MR. FELSEN: Your Honor, just the one issue 17 with respect to the checklist that you directed us to 18 meet and confer on. 19 THE COURT: Yes. So that will be part of the 20 minute entry order. Ms. Fitzgerald, anything else? 21 MS. FITZGERALD: No, your Honor. Thank you. 22 THE COURT: All right. We're almost at the finish line here with regard to discovery. So I know 23 24 this has been a laborious process. I'm glad to hear the 25 parties are on track to complete the discovery and the

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    expert practice. So I wish you guys a good holiday
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             Take care. And stay safe, everyone.
    season.
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              MS. FITZGERALD: Thank you. You too, Judge.
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              THE COURT: Thank you so much.
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              MR. FELSEN: Thank you, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Take care. Bye-bye.
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                          (Matter concluded)
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CERTIFICATE

I, MARY GRECO, hereby certify that the foregoing transcript of the said proceedings is a true and accurate transcript from the electronic sound-recording of the proceedings reduced to typewriting in the above-entitled matter.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative or employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor a relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested directly or indirectly in this action.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this ${\bf 21st}$ day of ${\bf December}$, 2023.

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